In 1976, Knuth [14] asked if the stable marriage problem (SMP) can be generalized to marriages consisting of 3 genders. In 1988, Alkan [1] showed that the natural generalization of SMP to 3 genders (3GSM) need not admit a stable marriage. Three years later, Ng and Hirschberg [16] proved that it is NP-complete to determine if given preferences admit a stable marriage. They further prove an analogous result for the 3 person stable assignment (3PSA) problem.
Introduction

Previous Work
Overview of our results
3 gender stable marriages (3GSM)
We formalize two optimization variants of 3GSM: maximally stable marriage (3G-MSM) and maximum stable submarriage (3G-MSS). For 3G-MSM, we seek a perfect (3 dimensional) marriage which minimizes the number of unstable triples-triples of players who mutually prefer each other to their assigned families. For 3G-MSS, we seek a largest cardinality submarriage which contains no unstable triples among the married players. Exact computation of both of these problems is NP-hard by Ng and Hirschberg's result [16] . Indeed, exact computation of either allows one to detect the existence of a stable marriage.
We obtain the following inapproximability result for 3G-MSM and 3G-MSS.
Theorem 1.1 (Special case of Theorem 3.1). There exists an absolute constant c < 1 such that it is NP-hard to approximate 3G-MSM and 3G-MSS to within a factor c.
In fact, we prove a slightly stronger result for 3G-MSM and 3G-MSS. We show that the problem of determining if given preferences admit a stable marriage or if all marriages are "far from stable" is NP-hard. See Section 2.1 and Theorem 3.1 for the precise statements. In the other direction, we describe a polynomial time constant factor approximation algorithm for 3G-MSM. Theorem 1.2. There exists a polynomial time algorithm, AMSM, which computes a 4 9 -factor approximation to 3G-MSM. Corollary 1.3. 3G-MSM is APX-complete.
Three person stable assignment (3PSA)
We also consider the three person stable assignment problem (3PSA). In this problem, players rank all pairs of other players and seek a (3 dimensional) matching-a partition of players into disjoint triples. Notions of stability, maximally stable matching, and maximum stable submatching are defined exactly as the analogous notions for 3GSM. We show that Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 have analogues with 3PSA: Theorem 1.4. There exists a constant c < 1 such that it is NP-hard to approximate 3PSA-MSM and 3PSA-MSS to within a factor c. Theorem 1.5. There exists a polynomial time algorithm, ASA, which computes a 4 9 -factor approximation to 3PSA-MSM.
Our proofs of the lower bounds in Theorems 1.1 and 1.4 use a reduction from the 3 dimensional matching problem (3DM) to 3G-MSM. Kann [11] showed that Max-3DM is Max-SNP complete. Thus, by the PCP theorem [2, 3] and [4] , it is NP-complete to approximate Max-3DM to within some fixed constant factor. Our hardness of approximation results then follow from a reduction from 3DM to 3G-MSM. Theorems 1.2 and 1.5 follow from a simple greedy algorithm. Our algorithm constructs marriages (or matchings) by greedily finding triples whose members are guaranteed to participate in relatively few unstable triples. Thus, we are able to efficiently construct marriages (or matchings) with a relatively small fraction of blocking triples.
Background and Definitions
3 Gender Stable Marriage (3GSM)
In the 3 gender stable marriage problem, there are disjoint sets of women, men, and dogs denoted by A (for Alice), B (for Bob), and D (for Dog), respectively. We assume |A| = |B| = |D| = n, and we denote the collection of players by V = A ∪ B ∪ D. A family is a triple abd consisting of one woman a ∈ A, one man b ∈ B, and one dog d ∈ D. A submarriage S is a set of pairwise disjoint families. A marriage M is a maximal submarriage-that is, one in which every player v ∈ V is contained in some (unique) family so that |M | = n. Given a submarriage S, we denote the function p S : V → V 2 ∪ {∅} which assigns each player v ∈ V to their partners in S, with p S (v) = ∅ if v is not contained in any family in S.
Each player v ∈ V has a preference, denoted v over pairs of members of the other two genders. That is, each woman a ∈ A holds a total order a over B × D ∪ {∅}, and similarly for men and dogs. We assume that each player prefers being in some family to having no family. For example, bd a ∅ for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B and d ∈ D. An instance of the three gender stable marriage problem (3GSM ) consists of A, B, and D together with a set P = { v | v ∈ V } of preferences for each v ∈ V .
Given a submarriage S, a triple abd is an unstable triple if a, b and d each prefer the triple abd to their assigned families in S. That is, abd is unstable if and only if bd a p S (a), ad b p S (b), and ab d p S (d). A triple abd which is not unstable is stable. In particular, abd is stable if at least one of a, b and d prefers their family in S to abd. Let A S , B S and D S be the sets of women, men and dogs (respectively) which have families in S. A submarriage S is stable if there are no unstable triples in
Unlike the two gender stable marriage problem, this three gender variant arbitrary preferences need not admit a stable marriage. In fact, for some preferences, every marriage has many unstable triples (see Section 3.1). Thus we consider two optimization variants of the three gender stable marriage problem.
Maximally Stable Marriage (3G-MSM)
The maximally stable marriage problem (3G-MSM) is to find a marriage M with the maximum number of stable triples with respect to given preferences P . For fixed preferences P and marriage M , the stability of M with respect to P is the number of stable triples in A × B × D:
Thus, M is stable if and only if stab(M ) = n 3 . Dually, we define the instability of M by ins(M ) = n 3 − stab(M ). For fixed preferences P , we define
For preferences P and fixed c < 1, we define Gap c -3G-MSM to be the problem of determining if MSM(P ) = n 3 or MSM(P ) ≤ cn 3 .
Maximum Stable Submarriage
The maximum stable submarriage problem (3G-MSS) is to find a maximum cardinality stable submarriage S. We denote MSS(P ) = max {|S| | S is a stable submarriage} Note that P admits a stable marriage if and only if MSS(P ) = n. For fixed c < 1, we define Gap c -3G-MSS to be the problem of determining if MSS(P ) = n or if MSS(P ) ≤ cn.
Three person stable assignment (3PSA)
In the three person stable assignment problem (3PSA), there is a set U of |U | = 3n players who wish to be partitioned into n disjoint triples. For a set C ⊆ U , we denote the set of k-subsets of C by C k . A submatching is a set S ⊆ U 3 of disjoint triples in U . A matching M is a maximal submatching-a submatching with |M | = n. Given a submatching S, U S is the set of players contained in some triple in S:
Each player u ∈ U holds preferences among all pairs of potential partners. That is, each u ∈ U holds a linear order u on U \{u} 2 ∪ {∅}. We assume that each player prefers every pair to an empty assignment. Given a set P of preferences for all the players and a submatching S, we call a triple uvw ∈ U S 3 unstable if each of u, v and w prefer the triple uvw to their assigned triples in S. Otherwise, we call uvw stable. A submatching S is stable if it contains no unstable triples in U S 3 . We define the stability of S by
Dually, the instability of S is ins(S) = |S| 3 − stab(S). The maximally stable matching problem (3PSA-MSM ) is to find a matching M which maximizes stab(M ). The maximum stable submatching problem (3PSA-MSS ) is to find a stable submatching S of maximum cardinality.
Remark 2.1. We may consider a variant of 3PSA with unacceptable partners. In this variant, each player u ∈ U ranks only a subset of U \{u} 2
, and prefers being unmatched to unranked pairs. 3GSM is a special case of this variant where U = A∪B ∪D and each player ranks precisely those pairs consisting of one player of each other gender. This observation will make our hardness results for 3GSM easily generalize to 3PSA.
Hardness of Gap c -3DM-3
Our proofs of Theorems 1.1 and 1.4 use a reduction from the three dimensional matching problem (3DM). In this section, we briefly review 3DM, and state the approximability result we require for our lower bound results.
Let W , X and Y be finite disjoint sets with |W | = |X| = |Y | = m. Let E ⊆ W × X × Y be a set of edges. A matching M ⊆ E is a set of disjoint edges. The maximum 3 dimensional matching problem (Max-3DM ) is to find (the size of) a matching M of largest cardinality in E. Max-3DM-3 is the restriction of Max-3DM to instances where each element in W ∪ X ∪ Y is contained in at most 3 edges. For a fixed constant c < 1, we define Gap c -3DM-3 to be the problem of determining if an instance I of Max-3DM-3 has a perfect matching (a matching M of size m) or if every matching has size at most cm. Theorem 2.2. There exists an absolute constant c < 1 such that Gap c -3DM-3 is NP-hard.
Kann showed that Max-3DM-3 is Max-SNP complete 2 by giving an L-reduction from Max-3SAT-B to Max-3DM-3 [11] . By the celebrated PCP theorem [2, 3] and [4] , Kann's result immediately implies that Max-3DM-3 is NP-hard to approximate to within some fixed constant factor. However, Kann's reduction gives a slightly weaker result than Theorem 2.2. In Kann's reduction, satisfiable instances of 3SAT-B do not necessarily reduce to instances of 3DM-3 which admit perfect matchings. In Appendix A, we describe how to alter Kann's reduction so that satisfiable instances of 3SAT-B admit perfect matchings, while far-from-satisfiable instances are far from admitting perfect matchings.
Hardness of Approximation
In this section, we prove the main hardness of approximation results. Specifically, we will prove the following theorems. 
Preferences for 3GSM with Many Unstable Triples
Theorem 3.3. There exist preferences P for 3GSM and a constant c < 1 for which MSM(P ) ≤ cn 3 .
We describe preferences P for which every marriage has Ω(n 3 ) blocking triples below. Assuming n is even, we partition each gender into two equal sized sets
The sets appearing in the preferences indicate that the player prefers all pairs in that set (in any order) followed by the remaining preferences. For example, all a 1 ∈ A 1 prefer all partners bd ∈ B 1 × D 1 , followed by all partners in B 2 × D 2 , followed by all other pairs in arbitrary order. Within B 1 × D 1 and B 2 × D 2 , a 1 's preferences are arbitrary. The full proof of Theorem 3.3 is given in Appendix B.
The Embedding
We now describe an embedding of 3DM-3 into 3G-MSM. Our embedding is a modification of the embedding described by Ng and Hirschberg [16] . Let I be an instance of 3DM-3 with ground sets W, X, Y and edge set E. We assume |W | = |X| = |Y | = m. We will construct an instance f (I) of 3G-MSM with sets A, B and D of women, men and dogs of size n = 6m and suitable preferences P . We divide each gender into two sets
Without loss of generality, we assume each a i is contained in exactly 3 edges by possibly increasing the multiplicity of edges containing a i . For j = 1, 2, we form sets
for j = 1, 2. We now define preferences for each set of players, beginning with those in A.
The players in B have preferences given by
The sets A j , B j and D j in the preferences described above indicate that all players in these sets appear consecutively in some arbitrary order in the preferences. Ellipses indicate that all remaining preferences may be completed arbitrarily. For example, a . She then prefers all remaining pairs in B 1 D 1 in any order, followed by all pairs in B 2 D 2 , followed by the remaining pairs in any order.
Lemma 3.4. The embedding f : 3DM-3 −→ 3GSM described above satisfies 1. If opt(I) = m-that is, I admits a perfect matching-then f (I) admits a stable marriage (i.e. MSM(P ) = n 3 ).
If opt(I)
≤ cm for some c < 1, then there exists a constant c < 1 depending only on c such that MSM(P ) ≤ c n 3 .
Proof. To prove the first claim assume, without loss of generality, that
} is a perfect matching in E. It is easy to verify the marriage
contains no blocking triples, hence is a stable marriage. The hardness of Gap c -3G-MSS is a consequence of the hardness Gap c -3G-MSM. Consider an instance of 3GSM with preferences P . We make the following observations.
1. MSM(P ) = n 3 if and only if MSS(P ) = n.
If MSM(P )
The first observation is clear. To prove the second, suppose that MSS(P ) > (1 − ε)n, and let S be a maximum stable submarriage. We can form a marriage M by arbitrarily adding εn disjoint families to S. Since each new family can induce at most 3n 2 blocking triples, M has at most 3εn 3 blocking triples, hence MSM(P ) > (1 − 3ε)n 3 . The two observations above imply that any decider for Gap (1−ε) -3G-MSS is also a decider for Gap (1−3ε) -3G-MSM. Thus, the NP-hardness of Gap c -3G-MSM immediately implies the analogous result for Gap c -3G-MSS.
A sketch of the proof of analogous lower bounds for 3PSA is given in Appendix C.1.
Approximation Algorithms
3GSM approximation
In this section, we describe a polynomial time approximation algorithm for MSM, thereby proving Theorem 1.2. Consider an instance of 3GSM with preferences P , and as before A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n }, B = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n }, and
we define its stable set S ijk to be the set of (indices of) triples which cannot form unstable triples with a i b j d k . Specifically, we have
The idea of our algorithm is to greedily form families that maximize |S ijk |. Pseudocode is given in Algorithm 1.
It is easy to see that AMSM can be implemented in polynomial time. The naive algorithm for computing |S ijk | for fixed ijk ∈ [n] 3 by iterating through all triples αβδ ∈ [n] 3 and querying each player's preferences can be implemented in timeÕ(n 3 ). The maximal such |S ijk | can then be found by iterating through all ijk ∈ [n] 3 . Thus the first step in AMSM can be accomplished in timeÕ(n 6 ). Finally, the recursive step of AMSM terminates after n iterations, as each iteration decreases the size of A, B, and D by one. 
Proof. We will show that there exists a triple a i b j d k such that at least two of a i , b j , and d k respectively rank b j d k , a i d k , and a i b j among their top n 2 /3 + 1 choices. Note that this occurs precisely when at least two of the the following inequalities are satisfied
and
Mark each triple a i b j d k which satisfies one of the above inequalities. Each a i induces n 2 3 + 1 marks, so we get n 3 3 + n marks from all a ∈ A. Similarly, we get n 3 3 + n marks from B and D. Thus, marks are placed on at least n 3 + 3n triples. By the pigeonhole principle, at least one triple is marked twice.
We claim that the triple a i b j d k satisfying two of the above inequalities satisfies equation (1). Without loss of generality, assume that a i b j d k satisfies the first two equations. Thus, a i and b j must each contribute at least We are now ready to prove that AMSM gives a constant factor approximation for the maximally stable marriage problem.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. Let M be the marriage found by AMSM, and suppose (n − i + 1) 2 + O(n) new unstable triples (not containing any a j , b j , or d j for j < i). Thus, the total number of unstable triples in M is at most
Thus, we have stab(M ) ≥ 4n 3 /9 − O(n 2 ) as desired.
A proof of the analogous result for 3PSA (Theorem 1.5) is given in Appendix C.2.
Concluding Remarks and Open Questions
While AMSM gives a simple approximation algorithm for 3G-MSM, we do not generalize this result to 3G-MSS. Indeed, even the first two families output by AMSM may include blocking triples. We leave the existence of an efficient approximation for 3G-MSS as a tantalizing open question.
Open Problem 5.1. Is it possible to efficiently compute a constant factor approximation to 3G-MSS?
Finding an approximation algorithm for maximally stable marriage was made easier by the fact that any preferences admit a marriage/matching with Ω(n 3 ) stable triples. However, for 3G-MSS, it is not clear whether every preference structure admits stable submarriages of size Ω(n). We feel that understanding the approximability of 3G-MSS is a very intriguing avenue of further exploration.
Open Problem 5.2. How small can a maximum stable submarriage/submatching be? What preferences achieve this bound?
In our hardness of approximation results (Theorems 3.1 and 3.2), we do not state explicit values of c for which Gap c -3G-MSM and Gap c -3G-MSS (and the corresponding problems for three person stable assignment) are NP-complete. The value implied by our embedding of 3SAT-B via 3DM-3 is quite close to 1. It would be interesting to find a better (explicit) factor for hardness of approximation. Conversely, is it possible to efficiently achieve a better than 4/9-factor approximation for maximally stable marriage/matching problems?
Open Problem 5.3. For the maximally stable marriage/matching problems, close the gap between the 4/9-factor approximation algorithm and the (1 − ε)-factor hardness of approximation.
The preference structure described in the proof of Theorem 3.3 (upon which our hardness of approximation results rely), there exist many quartets of pairs
Thus a does not consistently prefer pairs including b 1 to those including b 2 or vice versa. Ng and Hirschberg describe such preferences as inconsistent, and asked whether consistent preferences always admit a (3 gender) stable marriage. Huang [8] showed that consistent preferences need not admit stable marriages, and indeed it is NP-complete to determine whether or not given consistent preferences admit a stable marriage.
Open Problem 5.4. Are MSM and MSS still hard to approximate if preferences are restricted to be consistent? correspond alternatingly to u i and u i . A maximal matching on the ring corresponds to a choice a truth value of u i : if the edges containing the vertices labeled u i are in the matching, this corresponds to u i having the value true; if the edges containing u i are chosen, this corresponds to u i taking the value false. See Fig 1. In the classical construction, the points of the ring corresponding to u i are connected to clause vertices via clause edges which encode the clauses in C. This is done in such a way that the formula I is satisfiable if and only if the corresponding matching problem admits a perfect matching. The problem with this embedding, however, is that even if a relatively small fraction of clauses in C can be simultaneously satisfied, the corresponding matching problem may still admit a nearly perfect matching.
To remedy this problem, Kann's reduction maps each Boolean variable u i to many rings. The rings are then connected via a tree structure whose roots correspond to instances of u i in the clauses of C. This tree structure imposes a predictable structure on the maximal matchings.
We denote the parameter
which is the number of rings to which each variable u i maps. We denote the "free elements"-the points on the rings-associate to u i by the variables
These vertices are connected to rings as in Figure 1 . The rings are connected via tree edges in 2d i binary trees, such that for each fixed γ,
are the leaves of a tree, and similarly for the v i [γ, k]. We label the root of this tree by
depending on the labels of the leaves. See Figure 2 . We refer to the resulting structure for u i as the ring of trees corresponding to u i . The root vertices are connected via clause edges to clause vertices. For each c j ∈ C, we associate two clause vertices s 1 [j] and s 2 [j] . If c j is u i 's γ-th clause in C, then we include the edge
depending if u i or its negation appears in c j and the parity of the of the tree of rings. We denote the resulting instance of 3DM by f (I). It is readily apparent from this construction that f (I) is in fact an instance of 3DM-3: all vertices in the rings of trees are contained in exactly 2 edges, while clause vertices are contained in at most 3 edges. Further, the vertex set V can be partitioned into a disjoint union W ∪ X ∪ Y such that each edge contains one vertex from each of these sets. Kann makes the following observations about the structure of optimal (maximum) matchings in f (I).
Lemma A.1. Let I be an instance of 3SAT-B. Let f (I) be an instance of 3DM-3 constructed as above. Then each optimal matching M in f (I) is associated with an optimal assignment in I, and has the following structure.
Figure 1: The ring structure for the embedding of 3SAT-B into 3DM-3. The ring shown corresponds to a variable u i with d i = 4. An optimal matching in the ring corresponds to a truth value of for the variable u i : the blue edges correspond to the value true while the green edges correspond to the value false.
1. For each variable u i , M contains either all edges containing v i [γ, k] or all the edges containing v i [γ, k], depending on the value u i in the optimal assignment for I.
As a consequence of Kann's analysis of the optimal matchings in f (I), he is able to show that f is an L-reduction from 3SAT-B to 3DM-3.
A.2 Modification of Kann's reduction
In this section, we describe a reduction f : 3SAT-B −→ 3DM-3 such that for each satisfiable instance I of 3SAT-B, f (I) admits a perfect matching. In the reduction f above, even if I is satisfiable, there may be many root vertices that are not in an optimal matching, M . In particular, if a clause c j is satisfied by u i and u i , then at most one of the edges
can appear in M . Hence, at most one of u i [γ] and u i [γ ] can appear in M . To remedy this problem, we define f (I) to be the disjoint union of three copies of f (I)
We then add an edge for each root vertex in f (I) that contains the corresponding root vertices in each disjoint copy of f (I). Specifically, if 
in f (I). We now describe the structure of optimal matchings M in f (I). Let M 1 , M 2 , and M 3 be the restrictions of an optimal matching M for f (I) to f (I) 1 , f (I) 2 , and f (I) 3 respectively. Thus, we can write
where R contains those edges in M of the form (2).
Lemma A.2. There exists an optimal matching M for f (I) such that the matchings M 1 , M 2 , and M 3 contain precisely the same edges as an optimal matching M for f (I).
Proof. Suppose M is an optimal matching for f (I). We may assume without loss of generality that the matchings M 1 , M 2 and M 3 are all identical to some matching M on f (I). Indeed, if, say M 1 is the largest of the three matchings, we can increase the size of M by replacing M 2 and M 3 with identical copies of M 1 . Since the only edges between M 1 , M 2 , and M 3 are edges of the form (2), replacing M 2 and M 3 with copies of M 1 cannot decrease the size of M . Thus, we may assume that
where M is some matching on f (I), and R consists of edges of the form (2).
We will now argue that M is indeed an optimal matching on f (I), hence has the form described in Lemma A.1. Notice that if M is optimal for f (I), then by including all edges in R containing uncovered root vertices, M covers every ring, tree, and root vertex. Thus, the only way to obtain a larger matching would be to include more clause edges. However, by Lemma A.1, including more clause edges cannot increase the size of the matching M . Thus, we may assume M is an optimal matching for f (I). Proof. We bound the number of ring, tree, and clause vertices separately. Since the vertex set of f (I) consists of three disjoint copies of the vertices in f (I), it suffices to bound the number of vertices in f (I). 
Ring vertices
B Preferences with Many Unstable Triples
We first consider the case where n = 2. We denote A = {a 1 , a 2 }, B = {b 1 , b 2 }, and D = {d 1 , d 2 }. Consider preference lists P as described in the following table, where most preferred partners are listed first.
player preferences
The ellipses indicate that the remaining preferences are otherwise arbitrary. Suppose M is a stable marriage for P . We must have either
Therefore, no such stable M exists. In particular, every marriage M contains at least one unstable triple. The idea of the proof of Theorem 3.3 is to choose preferences P such that when restricted to many sets of two women, two men and two dogs, the preferences are as above. Thus any marriage containing families consisting of these players must induce unstable triples.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. We partition the sets A, B and D each into two sets of equal size: A = A 1 ∪ A 2 , B = B 1 ∪ B 2 , D = D 1 ∪ D 2 . Consider the preferences P described in Section 3.1. We will prove that for P , every matching M contains at least n 3 /128 unstable triples. Let M be an arbitrary marriage, and suppose ins(M ) < n 3 /128. We consider two cases separately. 9 -approximation to a maximally stable matching, as desired.
. . . . . . where d i is the number of occurrences of u i or its negation in I. As described in Lemma A.1, an optimal matching in the ring of trees can be obtained by a consistent choice of all blue or green vertices in all the rings associated to u i , then covering as many remaining vertices as possible with tree edges (a greedy "leaf to root" approach works). It is clear that such a matching will cover all vertices, except for half of the root vertices (those corresponding to either u i or u i ).
· · ·
